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 Abstract 
Three topics dominate the formulation an international greenhouse-gas regime 
as part of an effective global environmental policy. Efficiency, equity, and 
uncertainty. And three major policy instruments are discussed as regards the 
implementation of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
carbon tax/C02-charge, joint implementation, and  tradeable emission 
certificates. 
This paper tries to answer a question that has not been rigidly asked before: 
How could tradeable emission certificates be tailored in such a way as to be of 
benefit to the developing countries, to facilitate global environmental protection 
and economic development at the same time, and to meet both the efficiency 
and the equity criterion in international relations. 
Next to market organization and rules of procedure, allocation of the 
entitlements is crucial. The author suggests a dynamic formulae, by which the 
initial allocation of certificates starts on the basis of current greenhouse-gas 
emissions but over time turns towards equity in the form of equal per capita 
emissions.  In this way, making emission entitlements tradeable among 
countries implies not only that a globally effective limit to total emissions is 
attained with certainty, but also that the current unfair allocation of emission 
entitlements is consecutively shifted in favour of the poor countries. 
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  "The neat resolution of a free market that so 
beautifully reconciles byers and sellers does so far 
not reconcile growthists and earthists. Something 
new is needed." Nathan Keyfitz 
I. The Idea and its Political Context 
With respect to the formulation and implementation of a global climate 
policy, the "Berlin Mandate", the most important concluding document of 
the first Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, adopted on 7 April 1995, says the following: 
"The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity  and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities  and 
respective capabilities". 
It continues: 
"The global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation  by all countries [...]; developed countries [should] set 
quantified target limitation and reduction objectives within specified time 
frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020". 
Finally, it states that 
"the process should begin without delay" (Berlin Mandate, 1995, italics 
added). 
As regards "joint implementation", an instrument which affects both 
industrialized and developing countries, the Conference of the Parties 
decided 
"to establish a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly among Annex I 
Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties that so 
request". 
3 During this pilot phase, a framework should be established 
"for reporting in a transparent, well-defined and credible fashion on the 
possible global benefits  and the national economic, social and 
environmental impacts as well as any practical experience or technical 
difficulties encountered" (Berlin Mandate, 1995, italics added). 
The idea for the present paper arose out of this complex context of 
ethics and environment. The specific question to be answered is the 
following one: What form should a future policy instrument for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions take if it is to enable both global 
environmental protection and global development while satisfying both the 
criteria of economic efficiency and  equity?  The answer, which will be 
explained in the following, is: by creating a market where so far no market 
exists, i.e. by introducing carefully designed internationally tradeable 
emission certificates. 
II. Theoretical Context 
Three main issues dominate the formulation of an international 
greenhouse-gas regime, in the form of a "Climate Protocol" within the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change that came into force in 1994: 
Efficiency, equity, and decision-making under uncertainty.  And three 
policy instruments dominate the question of practical implementation of 
such a protocol: Introduction of an international carbon tax and/or CO2 
charge, joint implementation, and tradeable emission certificates (Emis-
sions trading
1). The following discussion will cover all these instruments 
but will focus on the interactions between the equity issue and tradeable 
emission certificates. 
1. International Emission Charges 
Pearce has summed up the arguments in favour of introducing a carbon 
dioxide charge or carbon tax as an instrument of a global climate policy 
Incidentally, a concept for which twelve different names were found by the author in 
the English literature. 
4 (Pearce, 1991).
2 As his central argument he cites Baumol and Oates, who 
pointed out that a tax allows total emissions to be reduced at minimum 
cost (Baumol & Oates, 1975). A given tax will induce emitters with low 
marginal avoidance costs to reduce emissions, while those with high 
marginal costs will find it more appropriate to pay the tax. In general 
terms, taxes use the market mechanism to adapt in an optimum way to 
the greenhouse problem, while direct government regulation can, in the 
individual case, be extremely expensive. In a comparative study on the 
USA, Tietenberg established that the average ratio of "command and 
control costs" to "least-cost measures" was 4 : 1 (Tietenberg, 1990). 
Pearce adds four further advantages of a carbon tax. First, the 
revenue gained allows other taxes to be replaced (neutrality of effect). 
Second, the potential revenue opens up possibilities of substantial 
resource transfers from North to South. Third, it involves a constant 
inducement for industry to undergo structural change towards 
environment-friendly production. Fourth, if new (scientific) information 
about the climate problem and its impacts becomes available, the tax can 
be modified relatively easily. 
However, there are also several disadvantages of an international 
carbon tax, which should not be ignored. As we have only a rough idea of 
the price elasticity of the supply of and demand for fuel, particularly as 
concerns the great dimensions we would be dealing with in practice, there 
is considerable uncertainty as to how large a reduction in emissions would 
be (two examples are shown in Figure 1). Furthermore, it is widely held 
that the final incidence of a carbon tax is regressive. In addition, the real 
distribution effect of a tax solution is usually concealed, while that of a 
quantitative solution — as will be shown below — is transparent, at least 
in the initial stage. 
The following concrete examples of greenhouse gas emissions refer to 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions or the equivalent amount of carbon (C) 
— calculated at a ratio of 3.67 :1. If other greenhouse gases such as 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are included in the discussion 
about climate policy, it is recommended that they be expressed as 
equivalents of CO2. in order to introduce a common "currency unit" on the 
emission certificates market. 
5  
Probably the weightiest argument against the introduction of an inter-
national carbon tax is not concerned with economics but with 
organizational factors: the tax volume needed to initiate an appreciable 
global reduction in emissions would be so immense (the literature speaks in 
terms of several hundred billion dollars) that centralized administration would 
be unacceptable, yet an acceptable decentralized redistribution would 
probably be very difficult to organize (but see Hoel, 1991 and his comments 
on reimbursement parameters). 
There is also, however, an important ecological argument against an 
international carbon tax: in situations with rapidly increasing marginal 
environmental damage, taxes symbolize a possible economic 
compromise which the ecological system itself does not (can not) accept. In 
this case, quantitative (and immediate) restrictions are the only 
meaningful solution. Nor should one forget the problem of non-harmonized tax 
systems from country to country and region to region (particularly in the 
case of a mineral oil tax), which would be no less acute in the case of a 
carbon tax and, of course, the apparent reluctance of the OPEC 
Figure 1: Emission reduction effect of a carbon tax on fossil fuels - two examples         
6 countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) to compromise on the subject of 
global climate policy, especially a tax solution. 
It needs also to be mentioned that a tax on carbon  (or carbon 
equivalents) would be necessary as a response strategy to the climate 
problem, not a tax on energy in general. This has to do with the fact that 
the main task lies in extensively replacing fossil fuels by renewable 
sources of energy; this substitution effect would not occur if solar energy, 
for example, were also to be taxed on a global scale. 
While efficiency and equity are central criteria of the Framework 
Convention and the "Berlin Mandate", it is surprising to see that in these 
documents no specific proposal is made of an international tax solution. 
This is different in the case of the two other policy instruments, which are 
referred to explicitly or implicitly, and will be dealt with in the following 
sections. 
2. Joint Implementation 
As concerns the choice and structure of the policy instruments of global 
climate policy, Article 3, section 3 of the Framework Convention is 
especially relevant. This provision calls on the Parties to implement the 
measures agreed on in a cost-effective way: the desired reductions in 
emissions are to be achieved at minimum cost. In view of the ecological 
and economic context of a global climate policy, this efficiency clause is 
particularly significant: ecologically speaking — i. e. as regards the effect 
of greenhouse gases on the climate — it is completely irrelevant where in 
the world action is taken to reduce emissions, but if the costs of those 
reductions are to be kept at a minimum, then account will have to be taken 
of the fact that the marginal costs of reducing emissions (marginal 
avoidance costs) vary largely across the globe. In other words, strong 
economic arguments enter the climate policy arena. It was with this in 
mind that the instrument of "joint implementation" found its way into the 
Framework Convention (especially Article 4, sections 2a and 2b). At the 
first Conference of the Parties in Berlin in 1995, it was decided to 
introduce a pilot phase in order to gain respective experience. 
7 Basically, joint implementation is an offset version of a quantitative 
policy with tradeable certificates: a country (a branch of industry, a 
company) can fulfill its reduction obligations through a combination of 
national (internal) reductions and international (external) offsets (offsets 
here means emission reduction credits which, once they have formally 
been certified, could be traded internationally). Until recently, this has 
usually been interpreted as meaning that an Annex I Party to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (i. e., OECD countries and 
countries with economies in transition) can fulfill its emissions target not 
only by domestic reductions, but also by investing in avoidance activities 
in other Annex I countries. The 1995 Berlin Conference resolved that non-
Annex I states can also be included, on a voluntary basis. Joint 
implementation has thus become a policy instrument in the North-South 
context, and this provision can be seen as a first step towards a global 
climate policy of quantitative control and a system of internationally trade-
able emission certificates. 
A series of questions will have to be answered before it can be said 
how significant this policy instrument is or can become in the future 
(Jepma, 1995). Those questions which I feel to be most important, 
particularly from an ethical point of view, will now be dealt with in some 
detail. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change does not contain any 
definite target for the reduction of global emissions. According to Article 3, 
section 1, the industrialized countries, because of their 'historical debts' 
and their high emission levels, should 
"take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof. 
Along with their general commitments, i.e. developing inventories, 
promoting research etc., the industrialized countries assume certain 
additional obligations, particularly as regards the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions and the financial and technological transfer to developing 
countries. Since March 1994, all industrialized countries, including 
Eastern European States and the Russian Federation, are obliged 
"[to] adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of 
8 greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs." (Article 4, section 2, italics added) 
The exact legal scope of the term 'limiting
1 is difficult to assess, since 
the Convention does not provide any exact definition, but only a range of 
different aspects to be taken into account, inter alia, the corresponding 
need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth in the 
developing countries. 
Despite the lack of any precise timetable, Article 4, section 2a, clearly 
stipulates that the national policies to be adopted by the Parties have to 
be directed toward the 'limitation' of emissions, which should, according to 
the ordinary meaning of the term in the light of its object and purpose, 
amount to a significnt modification of present emission trends, but does 
not have to amount to the return to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The duty 
under that paragraph is therefore not merely a duty of conduct - as in 
paragraph 1, which applies to all Parties - but a duty of result. However, 
since no definite time-frame has been agreed upon, a certain increase in 
carbon dioxide emissions after 1994 may be considered as still falling 
under the scope of 'limiting
1. On the other hand, if the United States, for 
example, would entirely ignore their duty to limit their emissions for a long 
time, they would certainly act in breach of the Framework Convention. The 
agreed final aim as stipulated in the 1992 Convention is still 
"returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol." (Artikel 4, section 2b, italics added). 
So far, then, there does not exist a binding global reduction target on 
absolute reductions below the (ecologically much too high) 1990 emission 
level nor any country-specific  reduction target. Certain countries and 
groups of countries have, however, unilaterally committed themselves to 
definite reductions in emissions, including Germany, which, at the Berlin 
Conference, confirmed its assertion that by the year 2005, it would 
"reduce its emissions of CO2 to a level 25% lower than that of 1990" 
(speech by the Federal Chancellor, 5 April 1995). 
In this respect, joint implementation is for the time being only a policy 
instrument to make unilateral targets more flexible. However, in view of 
9 the varying marginal avoidance costs for greenhouse gases, from country 
to country and especially between North and South, a clear reduction in 
the cost of reducing emissions can be achieved. Or, to put it differently, an 
additional reduction in emissions can be achieved at no extra cost. 
Joint implementation can also unlock positive economic effects via the 
transfer of low-emission technologies to developing countries. The 
otherwise tremendous increase in emissions that is to be expected, for 
example, when China and India become ever more motorized and 
industrialized, could be neutralized or even reduced. This positive effect of 
joint implementation is especially important, as no targets for the 
reduction of emissions have hitherto been set in these and (almost all) 
other developing countries. 
One further important argument in favour of this policy instrument is 
that it can be applied without further delay, even if there is no global 
agreement on reduction obligations, or if no such agreement can be 
reached in the next few years. 
Joint implementation, then, is a potentially powerful policy instrument, 
both for the ecologically necessary reduction of emissions and for the 
economically desirable transfer of efficient technology. However, its 
implementation is faced with potent obstacles, which can be summed up 
under the categories of search costs, transaction costs and control costs. 
These obstacles have been analyzed in quite some detail (see e.g. the 
1994 Annual Report of the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(1995, pp. 21 ff.) and need not be repeated here. 
The success of the joint implementation instrument will depend 
crucially on the institutional arrangements that are agreed upon. Several 
models are conceivable: 
•  simple  bilateral   systems  of  negotiation  and   information  — the 
participating  states report the reductions in emissions they have 
achieved to the other Parties to the Convention; 
•  inclusion of an international institution (such as the Secretariat of the 
Framework Convention); this would act as a clearing house promoting 
the emergence of a joint implementation market; 
10 • in addition to that, an international institution (the Secretariat) monitors 
and verifies the reductions in emissions achieved as a result of joint 
implementation. 
One important component of these arrangements would consist in 
ascertaining the reduction in emissions effected by joint implementation in 
the form of "emission credits" for the investing country (branch, company). 
These credits are essential for two reasons. First, they provide the 
necessary incentive for investing capital abroad and, second, they must 
not run counter to the reduction of emissions at home (allegation of 
"modern sale of indulgences"). The Berlin Mandate, however, stipulates 
that 
"no credits shall accrue to any Party as a result of greenhouse gas 
emissions reduced or sequestered during the pilot phase from activities 
implemented jointly". 
In order to avoid possible failure of the joint implementation policy 
instrument inherent in this restrictive condition, the following compromise 
can be suggested: Emission credits should not be credited in full to the 
national emissions account, but only in part — 50%, for example (as 
suggested by France), or 75—80% (as suggested by WBGU, 1995). In 
this case, if the reductions in emissions that have been achieved were 
used to strengthen national reduction targets (for the EU, OECD or Annex 
I states), then joint implementation would indirectly lead to more stringent 
climate protection effects. 
It must be recalled that participation in joint implementation projects 
should not lead to any reduction in the overall financial obligations 
resulting from the Framework Convention or, indeed, in the actual and 
otherwise pledged development aid payments (Norway has submitted a 
proposal to this effect). 
Taken together, then, the debate about joint implementation ought to 
be seen as an opportunity to sound the trumpet that political possibilities 
exist for stabilizing the climate and for coupling them with proactive 
development policy. Nevertheless, the quantitative significance of joint 
implementation in the global context should not to be overestimated. This 
policy instrument will only allow the industrialized countries to fulfill the 
minor part of their obligations to reduce emissions. Even so, in the 
developing countries a process can get underway which would otherwise 
11 only get off late (or even too late) — and in the end, this process could 
lead to a more comprehensive system of internationally tradeable 
emission certificates. 
3. Internationally Tradeable Emission Certificates 
Tradeable emission certificates differ in various ways from joint 
implementation (or "external offsets"). Binding global obligations to reduce 
emissions will (must) result from the pending negotiations. The German 
Bundestag's Enquete Commission on Climate Policy, and also the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assumes that a reduction 
of global CO2 emissions by 50% compared to the 1987 levels (requiring 
an 80% reduction in the industrialized countries) must be reached by the 
year 2050 if the target of stabilizing the climate system is to be attained 
(see Table 1). 
For the present, let us assume that an agreement of this kind (or 
similar) is reached in the "Climate Protocol", to be negotiated on and 
resolved at the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto in 1997, or at a 
later stage. What could this mean for the choice and structure of a system 
of internationally tradeable emission certificates? 
 
Table   1:   CO2  emission plan,   Enquete   Commission  on  Climate  Policy 
(benchmark 1987, in %) 
Year  Industrialized countries  Developing countries  Whole world 
1990  +5  +11  +6 
1995  +6  +24  +10 
2000  - 4  +37  +4 
2005  - 20  +50  - 5 
2020  - 40  +60  - 20 
2050  - 80  +70  - 50 
Source:  Enquete Commission (1990).     
As part of the system of agreed quantified permissible global emissions, 
tradeable certificates would be handed out — for the whole duration of the 
agreement or, better still, for certain time periods — to the participating 
Parties on the basis of an allocation procedure that would also have to be 
12 agreed on (which both would probably be negotiated in parallel). When 
the agreement comes into force, the participants would receive 
certificates corresponding to the emission quantities they have been 
allocated. If this initial allocation were insufficient for a participant (a 
country, a branch, a company), the participant would have to acquire 
additional certificates via trade. For those participating in the system, 
therefore, an incentive to reduce emissions would be established, be it to 
minimize payments for the purchase of additional certificates or to 
maximize earnings from the sale or lease of surplus certificates. If the 
initial allocation to developing countries leads to substantial quantities of 
surplus certificates there, a potent mechanism for the transfer of 
resources would be created: developing countries could sell or lease their 
surplus certificates to industrialized countries for money, technologies or 
patents. 
So, there are certain similarities between an international emission 
charge  (price solution) and tradeable emission certificates (quantity 
solution): the issue of the initial allocation of certificates is similar to the 
issue of allocating the revenue from a charge. However, there are also 
several differences. 
The most important of these is that emission certificates exactly meet 
the emission reduction target in terms of quantity; the concurrent financial 
expenditure would be the result of the costs connected with achieving this 
target. This contrasts with an emission charge, which regulates financial 
expenditure but does not directly regulate the volume of the emissions. A 
further difference is that a charge generally means monetary transfers, 
while certificates could easily be traded for gratuities other than money 
(such as technologies or patents). A system of tradeable emission 
certificates, therefore, increases the scope of the negotiations between 
North and South — and might therefore be met with broad (possibly suf-
ficient) political approval for precisely that reason. 
Unlike in joint implementation projects, monitoring a system of 
tradeable emission certificates would be concerned with the (relatively 
simple) measurement of total emissions from a contracting state rather 
than the (more difficult) measurement of emission reductions of specific 
projects. The question of responsibility for adhering to the rules of 
procedure (i.e., compliance) is also easier, as one is not dealing with 
13 direct investments but with the sale or lease of a tradeable good (i.e., 
certificates). 
There are other theoretical and practical issues connected with a 
system of emission certificates (Victor, 1991) — the issues connected 
with implementation will be dealt with in the following section. Let me end 
the present section with a quotation from the 1995 IPCC Report, which in 
its chapter on response strategies (Chapter 10) states the following: 
"The consequences of climate change policy will be determined by the choice 
of policy instruments [...] For a global treaty, a tradeable quota system is the 
only potentially efficient arrangement where an agreed level of emissions is 
attained with certainty (subject to enforcement) [...] A choice of tradeable 
quotas at the international level would (at the same time) provide maximum 
flexibility for instrument choice at the domestic level". (italics added) 
III. From Theory to Practice 
As was said at the beginning, a practicable agreement on policy 
instruments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions has to satisfy 
several criteria, in particular those of efficiency, equity, and decision-
making under uncertainty. The weight given to the individual criterion will 
determine which of the possible policy instruments or combinations of 
instruments is being recommended. If, unlike on the national level, the cri-
teria of equity and uncertainty (particularly because of irreversible ecologi-
cal processes) play a special role on the international level, then there is 
much to be said in favour of tradeable emission certificates. Yet, their 
practical organization entails many potential snares which can be decisive 
for their acceptance. The following section will look in some detail at the 
questions of market organization, rules of procedure, and the initial 
allocation of emission certificates; other issues, which, I feel, are less 
problematic, will not be addressed here (see Epstein & Gupta, 1990). 
14 1. Market Organization 
Creating a market for internationally tradeable emission certificates is no easy 
undertaking, to put it mildly. Monitoring, certification, market access and market 
extension require careful management — what is more, in a highly complex 
area of policy. A debate about these implementation issues has at least 
begun, and thus one may expect the system to become established in the 
not too distant future. An UNCTAD study of 1992 had looked already into 
the institutional issues of market organization. 
One such issue is the number of actors on this market. A "mixed" trading 
system in which both governments and  companies participate could be 
optimal. Governments would remain subject to their international obligations, 
particularly to ensure that the certificates tally with actual emissions. Trade at 
the company level would enlarge the technical options of emission reduction. 
Yet, this could also mean that the volume of trade becomes too large. 
However, the major worry in the literature is that cartels could be formed. 
Whether or not this threat can be conquered will in the first place depend on the 
number of market participants, which speaks in favour of a more substantial 
number. If one were, for example, to start with the producers and importers of 
raw materials containing carbon, then, according to Maier-Rigaud, there would 
be about 500 actors on an EU certificates market. 
There are several ways of avoiding cartelIization on the emerging 
certificates market. Regular rounds to re-allocate or replace certificates could 
ensure a liquid and flexible market, and rules against hoarding and price rigging 
could be agreed on. And the final, drastic sanction against improper conduct 
could be "exit", although this would have an adverse effect on all the market 
participants. 
2. Rules of Procedure 
One question is whether emission certificates should be valid endlessly. 
Although any such "perpetual certificate" would not necessarily prevent the 
revision (and especially the tightening) of the global emission reduction 
target — a part of them could be withdrawn from the market or 
 
 
15 devalued regularly — much speaks in favour of certificates with only 
limited validity. For one thing, not all Parties to the Framework Convention 
will participate in the system from the start and, for another, this would 
counter existing fears of certificates being bought up by industrialized 
countries or multinational corporations. The other extreme version, 
whereby certificates would be leased but never sold, would only lead to 
more flexibility if a (more) frequent new issue was agreed on. One must 
say that the question of an optimum term for emission certificates is still 
an open one. In the literature, the ideas range from two to 20 years. 
In this context, Bertram (1992) has proposed an overlapping 
procedure, under which ten-year certificates would be issued and 10% 
withdrawn from the market every year. This proposal could be summed up 
by the following formula: 
"If certificates are valid for L years and a certain proportion P/L is withdrawn 
from the market every year, then a new tranche of certificates valid for L 
years can be issued." 
At any given time, therefore, the market would consist of a mix of 
certificates, some long-term, some short-term; countries (branches, 
companies) could accordingly maintain a mixed portfolio and a futures 
market (comparable with existing other 'futures markets') could emerge. 
The benefit of such a flexibilization of the system is obvious: it would 
be possible, on the basis of the most recent natural science evidence 
about pollution and the adaptability of the ecosystem, and of social 
science evidence as regards the limits to adaptability of the economic 
system, to hold subsequent negotiations on permissible emission limits, to 
include new sources and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions, and to allow 
additional countries to participate. 
Whatever happens, this benefit should not turn into a disadvantage as 
a result of excessive complexity or bureaucracy. Grubb & Sevenius (1992) 
have shown that revision periods in an overlapping system of between 
two and four years might be the best possible solution. Given the probable 
workings of the global climate regime that is to be established (such as 
annual conferences of the Parties, two-thirds majorities, gradual tightening 
of the climate protocol), this may well be a realistic assumption. 
16 3. Allocation of Certificates 
The crucial factor for the political acceptance of tradeable emission 
certificates will probably be that their design be ethically based, and their 
initial allocation be perceived as fair. Indeed, for many authors (including 
myself), the system hinges on the "equity factor". 
While the initial allocation of certificates does not predetermine the 
final distribution effect (i.e., real incidence), which ultimately is the result 
of market decisions (certificate price and quantity), it does predetermine 
the direction and possible volume of transnational resource transfer the 
system will involve. A certain distribution effect will, of course, result from 
all conceivable instruments of climate policy, especially where the 
dimensions are globally significant, but also in national solutions, be they 
price or quantity solutions. 
There are different ways of effecting the initial allocation of emission 
certificates. One distinction is that between burden-based  and 
responsibility-based criteria, the former laying emphasis on the burden of 
adjustment involved in the desired reduction in emissions, while the latter 
stresses the polluter-pays principle, either in terms of the current 
emissions or of historical and accumulated emissions. 
To a certain extent, the search for an ethically acceptable allocation 
formula in global climate policy reflects the old debate between "realists" 
and "idealists" in development policy (Sterner, 1994). 
• "Realists" would argue that certificates (and the rights to pollute they 
entail) must be allocated on the basis of either the current emissions or 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), since any other formula would 
be unacceptable (see, for example, Pearce, 1991). Ethically, this 
position is extremely weak and completely fails to satisfy any criterion 
of equity. In no way neither current emissions nor historical and 
accumulated emissions can be defined as "fair". Furthermore, this 
position ignores one, if not the, crucial advantage of an international 
system of certificates, which is that an additional transfer of resources 
can be set in motion. The "realistic" position is also unrealistic in that it 
almost completely ignores the developing countries, which are begin-
ning to take an interest in global climate policy precisely because eco-
logical necessity may turn out to be to their economic blessing. 
17 •  On the opposite side we have the "idealists", who insist, explicitly or 
implicitly, on the inclusion of historical and accumulated emissions (as a 
sign of "ecological guilt" or "historical debt" — indeed, some of them even 
argue that developing countries, for the time being, should not be integrated 
into the global climate regime (see, for example Hayes & Smith, 1993). 
Various allocation proposals have been put forward, with globally uniform 
per capita allocation presenting the strongest ethical claim. In this case, the 
initial allocation of emission certificates would be directly proportional to 
national population (in the current year or, as a softer version, in a base year, 
like 1992, for instance). It can be said that the practical consequences of this 
proposal would be considerable, if not revolutionary. Any industrialized country 
with above-average per capita emissions would have to purchase certificates 
from developing countries, not only in respect of fossil fuel consumption but also 
of all other sources and sinks of greenhouse gases, possibly with the exception 
of deforestation (slash-and-bum, clear-felling). Even under moderate projections 
as to the certificates prices that would ensue, there would then be a complete 
reversal of the presently existing net South-North transfers. (Grubb & Sebenius 
assume that it would be at least as much as current official development 
assistance (ODA), which is in the order of US$ 60 billion per annum.) 
Of course, the alternative to any extreme position is to find a mixed 
formula — a formula which will at least guarantee that there is a net transfer 
from the industrialized to the developing countries (and not vice versa) in 
implementing a global climate policy. Personally, I find the formula developed 
by William R. Cline (1992) extremely appealing: 
 
where Qg is the global emission target; Qi is the emission target of country i; 
w the weight of the criterion in question (sum of w = 1); h is historical 
emissions, y is GDP at purchasing power parity, and p is population; p is the 
share of country i in the global total; 0 is the benchmark year. 
18 This allocation formula includes the most important alternative criteria 
under discussion and weights them, a practice that has also been applied 
by the IMF (definition of country quotas), the United Nations Committee 
for Development Planning (definition of Least Less Developed Countries; 
LLDCs), and other institutions (Levi, 1991). The formula could be 
described as the necessary mixture of efficiency, equity and realism. 
Cline provides an illustrative example of this formula in action: the 
USA currently (1992) accounts for 25.7% of global GDP, 17.5% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (including deforestation), and 4.8% of the 
world's total population. The simple average of these three figures comes 
to 16%. Were a global emissions target of 4 billion tons of carbon to be 
agreed on by the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention, 
the USA's initial share would amount to 640 million tons. Current 
emissions, however, total 1.2 billion tons. Accordingly, the USA would 
either have to reduce its emissions by 50%, or purchase an additional 
100% of its initial share of allocated certificates. 
By contrast, India's share would come to 8% of global emissions or 
320 million tons of carbon, which would correspond to a surplus of some 
50 million tons (or 17% above current emissions), which India could then 
sell or lease on the international emission certificates market. 
As befits the logic of a mixed formula, the weighting of the three 
components could be modified in the course of time. For example, the 
weighting of the first criterion (historical, accumulated emissions) could be 
reduced from one-third down to zero over a period of, say, 20 years 
("phasing out") and that of the second criterion (GDP) from one-third down 
to zero over a period of 40 or 50 years. The final result then would be an 
ethically strong position, namely globally uniform per capita emission 
rights (i. e., the population criterion). 
A less formal, more 'political' solution of the allocation problem might 
lie in a compromise that could be described as follows: 
"The allocation of emission certificates changes over time, from a position 
based (more or less) on current emissions to a position of (more or less) 
equal per capita emissions." 
19 A strategic compromise of this nature might be acceptable both for the 
industrialized countries and the developing countries, since it offers a 
strong incentive for a fair (a fairer) future emissions situation for the whole 
world in general, and for the linking of environmental protection with 
economic development in particular — even though this perspective was 
not aimed for at either the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on 
Environment and Development or at the 1995 Berlin Climate Conference. 
V. Conclusions 
As far as national environmental policy is concerned, and in view of the 
high degree of institutionalization and the specific historical and cultural 
background of policy formulation and implementation in the industrialized 
countries, the author is very much in favour of a balanced instrumental 
mix,  which includes market-oriented and regulatory, price-based and 
quantity-based policy instruments. As regards the state of the international 
system and the emerging contours of the structure and function of the 
global climate regime, however, I do favour market-oriented quantity 
solutions, especially joint implementation in the regime's initial phase and 
tradeable emission certificates in its final phase. If their form is prepared 
with the necessary care, then Peter Bohm's succinct judgement seems 
justified: 
"Making emission quotas tradeable among countries implies not only that a 
globally efficient limit to total emissions is attained with certainty, ... but also 
that the initial emission quota distribution of the treaty is shifted in favour of 
the poorer countries" (Bohm, 1992, p. 112, italics added). 
This first best solution does not exclude regulation or taxation as second 
best solution. In particular, if the institutionalization of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) is to be pushed forward, then it will have to be 
financed by taxes, as conventional multilateral development assistance 
would otherwise be affected negatively. In this case, other forms of taxes 
and bases of assessment again appear on the political agenda, such as a 
tax on arms exports (see Brandt Report, 1983), on long-distance tourism 
(see  Mishan,  1970), or on international financial transactions (see 
Brundtland Report, 1987, and Qureshi/von Weizsäcker Report, 1995). 
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